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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANDREW D. MOENCH, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030382-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging 
his conviction for aggravated assault with a "gang enhancement/' a second degree 
felony.1 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did State v. Lopes prevent the imposition of a gang enhancement based upon 
petitioner's guilty plea in which he admitted committing an aggravated assault while 
acting in concert with at least two other individuals? 
Although the statute is more accurately referred to as the "group criminal 
activity" enhancement, Utah Courts commonly refer to it as the "gang enhancement." 
State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f 2 n.l, 980 P.2d 191 {"Lopes"). Therefore, the State will 
use the more common terminology to refer to the statute. 
2. Where the record demonstrates that petitioner understood the elements of both 
aggravated assault and the gang enhancement, and also admitted facts that satisfied those 
elements, did petitioner knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty? 
3 Did petitioner's trial counsel provide effective assistance? 
Standard of Review: A single standard of review applies to all three issues. This 
Court reviews "an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-
conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of 
law " Rudolph v Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4, 43 P 3d 467 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 
(Supp. 1999), the version of the gang enhancement statute in effect when petitioner pled 
guilty and was sentenced m 1999. Its full text is reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEiMENT OF THE CASE 
On 5 November 1998 the State charged petitioner with one count of murder, a first 
degree felony. R. 152-55, 262. The information noted that the murder charge was 
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 (the gang 
enhancement statute), because petitioner committed the crime in concert with two or 
more persons. Id. On 20 October 1999 petitioner pled guilty to one count of aggravated 
assault, a second degree felony, committed in concert with two or more persons. R. 161-
68, 177-78, 264. The trial court sentenced petitioner to serve six-to-fifteen years at the 
Utah State Prison. R. 245-46, 268. 
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On 15 February 2001 petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. R. 1. 
The post-conviction court reviewed the merits of petitioner's claims, found them 
unpersuasive, and dismissed the petition as frivolous. R. 112-14; Moench v. State, 2002 
UT App 333, *[ 3, 57 P.3d 1116. This Court reversed, finding that the post-conviction 
court erred by reaching the merits of the petition, rather than simply determining whether 
the petition was frivolous on its face. Moench, 2002 UT App 333, f 14. 
On 4 December 2002, following remand, the post-conviction court ordered the 
State to respond to the petition. R. 128. The State filed a response arguing that each of 
petitioner's claims failed as a matter of law. R. 134-246. After oral argument, the post-
conviction court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order denying the 
petition. R. 261-274, a copy of this document is attached as Addendum B. Petitioner 
timely appealed. R. 278. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Underlying Crimes 
Petitioner, a member of the "Straight Edge" gang, together with several fellow 
gang members, became involved in a fight with another group of young men including 
Bernardo Repreza. R. 262, Add. B. During the fight, Jason Cunningham and petitioner 
chased Repreza while Sean Darger yelled to the two to "get him.,, Id. Cunningham 
struck Repreza with an expandible police baton causing Repreza to fall. Id. Petitioner 
then hit Repreza several times in the head with either a baseball bat or a large piece of 
wood, seriously injuring Repreza. Id. As Repreza lay unconscious from the beating, 
Collin Ressor stabbed him in the abdomen. Id. 
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Medical evidence presented at the preliminary hearing demonstrated that Repreza 
died from the stab wound, rather than the blows that petitioner inflicted to his head. R. 
211-13, 263. Nevertheless, petitioner's beating rendered Repreza unconscious, giving 
Ressor the opportunity to stab and kill Repreza. R. 263. 
The Plea Agreement 
The State originally charged petitioner with murder, a first degree felony, subject 
to a gang enhancement. R. 152-55, 262 (Add. B). The State eventually made a plea 
offer, agreeing to reduce the charge to aggravated assault, a second degree felony, still 
subject to a gang enhancement. R. 168, 264 (Add B). The State also agreed that if the 
Court sentenced petitioner to prison, the State would remain silent on a motion to reduce 
the degree of the offense to a third degree felony. R. 168, 264 (Add. B). 
Petitioner's Plea Affidavit 
On 20 October 1999 petitioner accepted the State's plea offer and pled guilty to 
committing an aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons. R. 161-68, 180-
205, 264-267 (Add. B). Petitioner's plea affidavit set forth the elements of petitioner's 
crime as, "[t]he actor commits an assault and intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another. He does so in concert with two or more other people." R. 161, 265 (Add. B). 
Petitioner admitted the following facts in his plea affidavit: 
"[m]y conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime charged are as follows: On 
31 October 1998, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I intentionally struck Bernard 
Repreza in the head with a club. According to Dr. Leis, this resulted in 
serious bodily injury. Immediately prior to my striking him, Jason 
Cunningham struck him with a baton. We had been urged to chase and 'get 
him' by a third person/' 
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R. 161-62, 265 (Add. B). 
Petitioner also stated in his affidavit, "I know that if I wish to contest the charge 
against me, I need only plead 'not guilty' and the matter will be set for tnal. At the tnal 
the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt." R. 163, 265 (Add. B). He further declared, "I have read this 
statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney and I understand its provisions I 
know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this affidavit. I do not wish 
to make any changes because all of the statements are correct/' R 164, 265 (Add. B) 
The Plea Colloquy 
Petitioner was represented by Mr. Edward Brass. R. 184. In responding to the 
tnal court's questions regarding whether petitioner understood the charges against him 
and his constitutional nghts, Mr. Brass referred the tnal court to petitioner's plea 
affidavit R. 185-86. Mr. Brass informed the tnal court that petitioner had read his plea 
affidavit and did not have any questions about it. R. 186. He also told the tnal court that 
he was certain petitioner understood the affidavit. R. 186, 265 (Add. B). Mr Brass also 
explained that petitioner had signed the plea affidavit in his presence. R. 192. 
The tnal court then asked petitioner whether he intended to plead guilty to the 
"second amended information charging you with an aggravated assault with a gang 
enhancement." R. 186-87, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Yes." R. 187, 266 (Add. 
B) Petitioner also assured the tnal court that he understood the aggravated assault and 
gang enhancement charges in the second amended information. R. 187. The tnal court 
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also questioned petitioner about his physical and mental state and reviewed with him the 
constitutional rights he would waive by pleading guilty. R. 187-88, 266 (Add. B). 
The Court then asked Mr. Brass to state the factual basis of the plea and added, 
"obviously the factual statement will include each and every element of the offense as 
charged:' R. 188-89, 266 (Add. B). Mr. Brass replied, "It does." Id. 
Mr. Brass then read the factual basis as admitted by petitioner in his plea affidavit. 
R. 189, 266 (Add. B). The trial court then inquired of petitioner whether those facts were 
true. R. 190, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Yes, your Honor" Id. 
The trial court then asked, "by admitting and pleading guilty to the charge . . . 
you're admitting each and every element of the offense. Do you understand that?" R. 
190, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id. Petitioner also confirmed that he 
understood that the gang enhancement increased the maximum sentence that could be 
imposed to six-to-fifteen years. Id. 
The trial court then asked petitioner, "how do you plead to the charge of 
Aggravated Assault in the Second Degree, a Felony with a gang enhancement; guilty or 
not guilty?" R. 192, 266 (Add. B). Petitioner replied, "Guilty." Id. 
Based on petitioner's admissions in his plea affidavit and during the colloquy, the 
trial court specifically found that "this charge was done in connection with two or more 
persons," and "therefore, the gang enhancement is appropriate." R. 193-94, 267 (Add. 
B). The trial court accepted petitioner's plea, finding that he entered it "freely, 
voluntarily and knowingly." R. 194, 267 (Add. B). 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Regarding the Enhancement 
Following petitioner's plea, the trial court entered written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding the enhancement. R. 157-59, 267 (Add B) The findings 
state that petitioner "admitted facts in support of the plea including that he acted in 
concert with two other persons." R. 157, 267 (Add. B). The findings also state that "[a]s 
Cunningham and [petitioner] chased Repreza, Sean Darger, another "Straight-Edge" 
member, yelled at the two, "get him." R. 158. The findings continued, "[Petitioner], 
Cunningham and Darger each had the mental state required for commission of the assault 
on Repreza." R. 158, 267 (Add. B). 
The trial court imposed a gang enhancement at sentencing, resulting in a sentence 
of six-to-fifteen years in prison. R. 245-46, 268 (Add. B). 
The Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging: 
a) That Mr. Brass was ineffective because he: 
1) failed to move to reduce the degree of 
petitioner's offense, despite his promise to do 
so; 
2) failed to object to the imposition of a gang 
enhancement at sentencing; and 
3) failed to act in petitioner's best interest when 
he encouraged petitioner to accept the plea 
offer, rather than going to tnal on a murder 
charge; 
b) Petitioner's plea was not knowingly entered because: 
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1) he was not informed of the elements of the gang 
enhancement or that the State was required to prove 
the elements of the enhancement; and 
2) the factual basis to support his plea to the gang 
enhancement was insufficient pursuant to State v. 
Lopes, 
c) The gang enhancement statute was unconstitutional; 
d) The trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence petitioner when 
it failed to impose sentence within forty-five days of the entry 
of his plea. 
R. 7-8. The State responded that each of petitioner's claims failed as a matter of law. R. 
134-246. 
The post-conviction court set the matter for oral argument. R. 247. At that 
hearing, petitioner conceded that he was not entitled to relief on his claims that Mr. Brass 
was ineffective for failing to move to reduce the degree of his offense, and that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him. R. 269 (Add. B); 284: 3,12. Petitioner also 
proffered that his father was prepared to testify "that neither he nor the petitioner 
understood the plea and therefore . . . the plea was not voluntarily entered into." R. 284: 
8. Petitioner also proffered that he would testify that he did not understand the plea. Id. 
Following the parties' arguments, the post-conviction court stated that it tended to 
agree with the State's position and was prepared to rule based upon the pleadings, but 
would set the matter for an evidentiary hearing if petitioner so desired. R. 270 (Add. B); 
284: 24-25. After consulting with petitioner, however, his counsel explained they had 
concluded that "it was not in petitioner's interest to have an evidentiary hearing." Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Petitioner misreads State v. Lopes to hold that the gang enhancement can 
never be imposed based solely upon a defendant's guilty plea. He contends that under 
Lopes, the enhancement can only be applied if the criminal liability of the other %'in 
concert" actors is established either at a trial or by their pleas to identical crimes. 
Petitioner is mistaken. 
State v. Lopes held that a defendant has the right to have a jury decide whether the 
State has proven the elements of the gang enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Lopes recognized, however, that a defendant could waive his right to a jury trial by 
pleading guilty to the enhancement. The enhancement was improperly imposed in Lopes 
because the defendant entered a carefully worded conditional plea which did not admit 
the elements of the enhancement. Lopes explicitly recognizes, however, that the 
enhancement may be applied if a defendant admits the elements of the enhancement as 
part of his guilty plea. 
Point II. Petitioner's allegation that the trial court violated rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, in taking his plea, and that his plea was insufficient to justify 
imposition of the enhancement, is based upon his misunderstanding of Lopes. Even if 
petitioner could demonstrate a violation of Rule 11, that would not entitled petitioner to 
collateral post-conviction relief. In any event, his claim fails because it is based upon his 
misunderstanding of Lopes. 
Furthermore, the record of petitioner's plea demonstrates that he understood the 
elements of both the aggravated assault and the gang enhancement, and that he admitted 
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these elements as part of his guilty plea. Petitioner affirmatively waived the upportunity 
to present any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly 
held that petitioner's plea was validly entered and was sufficient to justify imposition of 
the gang enhancement. 
Point III. Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him 
to plead guilty to the enhancement is also based upon his misunderstanding of Lopes. 
Therefore, this claim fails. 
The post-conviction court also correctly held that petitioner's counsel was not 
ineffective for advising petitioner to accept the State's plea offer rather than go to trial. 
Because the evidence could have supported a murder conviction, the benefits of the 
State's offer outweighed the risks of going to trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STATE V. LOPES DOES NOT PREVENT THE IMPOSITION OF 
A GANG ENHANCEMENT BASED SOLELY UPON A 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA2 
Petitioner argues that the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v Lopes, 1999 
UT 24, % 17, 980 P.2d 191, declaring a portion of the gang enhancement statute 
unconstitutional, prevented the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement based 
solely upon petitioner's guilty plea. Br. Aplt. at 15-20. Petitioner contends that absent a 
tnal establishing the culpability of the other "in concert" actors, or evidence that those 
actors pled guilty to identical crimes, the State could not impose the enhancement. Br. 
2
 Although this point responds to petitioner's third issue, his first two issues 
cannot be resolved without resolving this issue; therefore, the State addresses this issue 
first. 
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Aplt. at 17-18. Petitioner's claim fails because Lopes recognizes that a guilty plea in 
which a defendant admits the elements of the gang enhancement provides a sufficient 
basis for imposition of the enhancement. See 1999 UT 24 at Iff 17, 22. 
The gang enhancement statute provides an increased penalty for certain crimes if 
committed "in concert with two or more persons." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 
(l)(a). To be guilty of acting "in concert," the actors "must (i) have possessed a mental 
state sufficient to commit the same underlying offense and (ii) have directly committed 
the underlying offense or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally 
aided one of the other two actors to engage in conduct constituting the underlying 
offense." Lopes, 1999 UT 24 atf 8. 
As originally drafted, section (5)(c) of the enhancement statute allowed a 
sentencing judge, rather than a jury to impose the gang enhancement if he found the 
requirements of the statute satisfied. The section stated: 
The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to impose 
the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the penalty is 
contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter written 
findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
§ 76-3-203.l(5)(c)(Supp. 1999). 
In Lopes, the Utah Supreme Court found section (5)(c) to be unconstitutional. 
1999 UT 24 at ^ 22. The Court reasoned that the enhancement statute "created a specific 
new crime," the elements of which had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at % 
15. As with any other crime, a defendant has a right to have a jury decide whether the 
State had satisfied its burden of proof. Id. at f^ 16. Because section (5)(c), as originally 
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drafted, allowed a sentencing judge to determine whether the elements of the 
enhancement were proven, the section violated a defendant's right to a jury trial under the 
Utah Constitution. Id. at f 17. Consequently, the Court found section (5)(c) 
unconstitutional, but found "the remaining portion of the gang enhancement statute 
constitutional." Id. at 20. 
In entering his guilty plea, the defendant in Lopes was careful not to admit the 
elements of the enhancement. See 1999 UT 24 at f 4 n.3. Lopes entered a conditional 
plea and "never conceded that all the elements of the enhancement statue were satisfied, 
i.e., that the other individuals shared the requisite mental state for murder." Id. 
Therefore, Lopes' carefully worded plea "did not establish all of the elements of the 
enhancement offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at Tj 17. 
Petitioner relies upon this language in Lopes to argue that a guilty plea can never 
establish the elements of the enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 17. Petitioner claims that under 
Lopes, an enhancement can never be applied unless a trial establishes the criminal 
liability of the "in concert" actors, or the actors plead guilty to an identical crime. Id. 
Petitioner misunderstands Lopes. 
Contrary to petitioner's reading, Lopes effectively recognizes that an enhancement 
can be imposed based upon a guilty plea that admits the elements of the enhancement. 
See 1999 UT 24 at ff 17, 22. The enhancement was improperly applied to Lopes 
because "[t]he elements of the crime were not established against Lopes, either by his 
plea or by a jury trial." Id. at f 22 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court acknowledged that 
Lopes' plea could have been sufficient to justify the imposition of the enhancement, had 
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he admitted the necessary elements See id at 1fl[ 17, 22 Moreover, the Court recognized 
that a guilty plea to the enhancement would waive the State's burden of proving the 
elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. See id at f 17 ("absent waiver, 
only a jury has the ability to determine when elements of a crime are established beyond 
a reasonable doubt"). 
Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's observation that Lopes' plea "did not 
establish the requisite mental state of the other actors," Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f 17, 
petitioner infers a general rule of law that "[o]ne person cannot enter a plea which 
establishes the mens rea of another." Br Aplt. at 17 The Court's observation in Lopes, 
however, did not established such a rule. Rather, the Court simply observed, based on 
the facts of Lopes' carefully worded conditional plea, that he did not admit that he acted 
in concert with the other actors. 
Unlike Lopes' conditional plea in which he refused to admit the elements of the 
enhancement, petitioner entered an unconditional plea admitting that he committed an 
aggravated assault "in concert with two or more people." R. 161 As discussed more 
thoroughly below, petitioner's plea admitted the elements of both the aggravated assault 
and the gang enhancement. Therefore, the enhancement was properly imposed based 
upon petitioner's plea. 
II. PETITIONER'S PLEA WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARILY 
ENTERED 
Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was invalid because (1) the trial court failed 
to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure by ensuring that he 
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understood the elements of his crime; and (2) his plea was insufficient to establish the 
"factual basis'1 for imposing the enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 11-13, 17-20. The post-
conviction court correctly found, however, that neither claim justified relief. 
A. Even if the trial court violated Rule 11 in taking petitioner's 
guilty plea, the error would be insufficient to entitle petitioner to 
relief. 
Petitioner contends that his plea was invalidly entered because the trial court did 
not strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by ensuring that he 
understood the elements of the crime to which he pled guilty. Br. Aplt. at 11-12. 
However, evidence that a trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 when taking a 
guilty plea is, in itself, insufficient to entitle a petitioner to post-conviction relief. See 
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). To obtain relief, a post-conviction 
petitioner must demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. See id.; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-35a-104 (2002). "Compliance with rule 11 is not constitutionally required." 
Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991. Therefore, "a petitioner must show more than a violation of the 
prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact 
not knowing and voluntary." Id. at 992. 
The United States Supreme Court announced the constitutional requirements for a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). 
Under Boykin, a defendant must understand that his guilty plea will waive (1) his 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (2) his right to trial by jury, and (3) his 
right to confront his accusers. Id. at 243. Additionally, a guilty plea "'cannot be truly 
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voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts '" Id at 243 n 5 (quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U S. 458, 466 (1938)) 
Petitioner argues that he did not understand the elements of his crime because the 
trial court failed to inform him dunng the plea colloquy that the gang enhancement could 
not be imposed unless the State had "already conclusively established accomplice 
liability." Br Aplt. at 13. As discussed above, however, the State was not required to 
establish the criminal liability of the other "in concert" actors in a separate proceeding. 
See Point I, above. Rather, the enhancement could be imposed based solely upon 
petitioner's guilty plea, provided the he admitted the elements of the enhancement. See 
id , Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ffl| 17, 22. Therefore, because petitioner's claim that the plea 
colloquy was inadequate is based upon his misunderstanding of Lopes, the claim fails. 
B. Petitioner understood that he was pleading guilty to committing 
an enhanced crime. 
Petitioner also claims that his plea was invalid because it failed to establish the 
factual basis for the gang enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 13-15. He argues that under Lopes, 
the factual basis for the enhancement could only be established by a separate adjudication 
of his cohort's guilt. Id, Again, petitioner's claim fails because it is based upon his 
misunderstanding of Lopes. Furthermore, the record of petitioner's plea demonstrates his 
understanding that by pleading guilty he would be admitting the elements of both 
aggravated assault and the gang enhancement. 
A court conducting a collateral review of a guilty plea is not "is not limited to the 
record of the plea hearing but may look at the surrounding facts and circumstances, 
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including the information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys before entering 
the plea." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. The entire record of petitioner's plea demonstrates 
that he understood he was pleading guilty to an enhanced crime. 
Petitioner's plea affidavit recited the elements of both aggravated assault and the 
gang enhancement. R. 161-62, 265 (Add. B). Petitioner admitted facts that satisfied 
those elements including that he committed an aggravated assault in concert with 
Cunningham, who beat the victim with an expandable police baton, and Darger who 
encouraged both Cunningham and Darger to uget" the victim. R. 161-62, 265 (Add. B). 
Mr. Brass assured the trial court that he understood the contents of his plea affidavit. R. 
185, 265 (Add. B). Mr. Brass also clarified that the gang enhancement was "included as 
part of the plea" and assured the trial court that he had explained the charges to petitioner. 
R.185. 
During his plea colloquy, petitioner twice assured the trial court that he understood 
that by pleading guilty to the enhanced charge, he was admitting each and every element 
of the enhanced offense. R. 189-90, 266 (Add. B). Furthermore, the trial court took care 
to ensure that petitioner understood he was pleading guilty not just to aggravated assault, 
but to the enhancement as well. R. 192, 266 (Add. B). 
Petitioner affirmatively waived his opportunity to present evidence that would 
contradict the record of his plea. Although petitioner alleged he had evidence that would 
demonstrate that he did not understand the elements of his enhanced crime, he declined 
the post-conviction court's invitation to hold a hearing where he could introduce this 
evidence. R. 270 (Add. B), 284:25. Consequently, petitioner failed to carry his burden 
16 
of proving that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and the post-conviction court 
correctly denied his claim. 
C. None of the additional challenges that petitioner raises establish 
that his plea was invalid. 
Petitioner also claims that additional alleged defects in his plea rendered it invalid 
and unable to support imposition of the gang enhancement. None of his alleged defects 
withstand scrutiny. 
Petitioner claims that the initial failure to identify Sean Darger as the individual 
encouraging petitioner to "get" the victim, and Darger's eventual acquittal of murder, 
demonstrate that the State had not, and allegedly could not establish Darger's culpability 
sufficient to justify imposition of the enhancement. Br. Aplt. at 13-15, 19-20. However, 
as discussed above, the State was not required to establish the culpability of petitioner's 
cohorts in a separate proceeding. See Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ff 17, 22. Rather, 
petitioner's plea waived the State's burden to prove Darger's culpability. See id. In any 
event, Darger's acquittal of murder does not establish that, absent petitioner's plea, the 
State could not have convicted Darger of aggravated assault.3 
Nor does Darger's acquittal of murder undermine the factual basis of 
petitioner's plea. To satisfy the factual basis requirement, "the record must reveal either 
facts that would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest 
a defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 
672 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Although Darger was acquitted of murder after petitioner 
entered his plea, R. 262, Darger could have been convicted as an accomplice to 
aggravated assault by encouraging petitioner and Cunningham to "get" the victim. 
Therefore, the State had evidence suggesting that petitioner faced "a substantial risk of 
conviction at trial" for both an aggravated assault and the gang enhancement. See 
Stilling, 856P.2dat672. 
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Petitioner also claims that the tnal court should have required him to enter 
separate pleas to the aggravated assault charge and the enhancement, rather than a single 
plea to an enhanced crime, because the enhancement is a separate offense. Br. Aplt. at 
13. However, petitioner cites no authonty for this claim. See id. Furthermore, the record 
demonstrates that petitioner understood he was pleading to both the underlying charge 
and the enhancement. The tnal court asked petitioner "how do you plead to the charge of 
Aggravated Assault in the Second Degree, a Felony with a gang enhancement; guilty or 
not guilty?" R. 192, 266 (Add B) (emphasis added). Thus, although petitioner entered a 
single plea, it is clear that he understood that his plea was an admission of both the 
underlying cnme and the enhancement. 
Petitioner also claims that because he entered a single plea, this Court cannot 
simply vacate the enhancement, but must vacate his entire plea. Br. Aplt. at 15. Because 
petitioner has not demonstrated any error in his plea there is no need to vacate 
petitioner's conviction for the aggravated assault or the gang enhancement. Even if there 
were some error in petitioner's plea to the enhancement, however, that would not require 
vacating his plea to the aggravated assault. As discussed above, petitioner understood he 
was pleading guilty to both the aggravated assault and the enhancement. Therefore, the 
Court could vacate the enhancement without disturbing petitioner's plea to the 
aggravated assault. 
III. MR. BRASS PROVIDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
Finally, petitioner claims that Mr. Brass provided ineffective assistance (1) by 
allowing him to plea guilty to the enhanced charge despite the holding in State v Lopes\ 
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and (2) by encouraging him to accept the State's plea offer, rather than going to trial on 
the murder charge. Br. Aplt. 7-11. Petitioner's first allegation fails because it is based 
upon his misunderstanding of Lopes. His second allegation fails because Mr. Brass's 
advice was objectively reasonable. 
A. Mr. Brass was not ineffective for allowing petitioner to plead 
guilty to the enhancement in light of Lopes. 
Petitioner claimed that Mr. Brass was ineffective because he uwas on notice that 
the gang enhancement had been struck down as unconstitutional and otherwise 
inapplicable to the Petitioner's plea, but failed to object to the enhancement and allowed 
the Petitioner's conviction to be unlawfully entered and enhanced." R. 7. Therefore, 
petitioner's claim is based upon his misunderstanding that Lopes required the State to 
establish the culpability of petitioner's cohorts in a separate proceeding before petitioner 
could plead guilty to the enhanced charge. Br. Aplt. at 6-8. Had Lopes actually held as 
petitioner contends, then Mr. Brass would have been ineffective for failing allowing 
petitioner to enter his plea. As discussed above, however, Lopes did not require the State 
to establish the culpability of petitioner's cohorts in a separate proceeding prior to 
petitioner's plea. Therefore, Mr. Brass was not ineffective for allowing petitioner to 
plead to aggravated assault and the enhancement. 
B. Mr. Brass's advice to accept the plea offer, rather than go to 
trial on a murder charge was objectively reasonable. 
Petitioner also claims that Mr. Brass was ineffective for encouraging him to accept 
the State's plea offer. Based upon "the preliminary findings that [petitioner's] actions 
was not the cause of death to the victim," he reasons that "it would have been impossible 
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for a reasonable jury to have concluded that he was guilty of murder." Br. Aplt. at 7. He 
also claims that "in retrospect," Sean Darger's subsequent acquittal on a murder charge 
for the same incident demonstrates the unlikelihood that the State could have convicted 
petitioner of murder. Id. at 8. Petitioner's claim fails because petitioner could have been 
convicted as an accomplice to murder. Furthermore, his claim is precisely the type of 
hindsight second-guessing that the United States Supreme Court prohibited in evaluating 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must meet the 
two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted 
by Utah courts in Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). Petitioner must 
establish that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, petitioner must demonstrate that 
counsels' "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In evaluating this prong, a court cannot second-guess 
counsels' legitimate strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those choices might 
appear in retrospect. Id. at 689. Moreover, a court must make every effort to "eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight" and "to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time." Id. 
To satisfy the second, or prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, petitioner 
must show that he was actually prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. This 
requires a showing that absent counsel's errors there is a reasonable probability of a more 
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favorable result. State v Simmons, 5 P 3d 1228, 1230 (Utah Ct App 2000), Strickland, 
466 U S at 694, 104 S Ct. at 2068. When a petitioner claims that his guilty plea resulted 
from ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner demonstrates prejudice by showing 
that ''there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v Lockhart, 474 U S. 52, 
57,59(1985). 
The post-conviction court correctly found that Mr. Brass provided effective 
assistance Mr. Brass did not encourage petitioner to plead guilty to a crime that no jury 
would have convicted him of committing. Although the evidence would have shown that 
petitioner did not directly cause the victim's death, petitioner could have been convicted 
as an accomplice to murder. A person who possesses the requisite mental state and 
"solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense" may be convicted of the offense as an 
accomplice, even though they may not have directly committed the offense. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1999). As the post-conviction court observed, the beating 
petitioner inflicted on the victim rendered the victim unconscious and gave Colin Ressor 
the opportunity to stab and kill the victim. R. 263 (Add. B). Therefore, petitioner could 
have been convicted of murder under the accomplice liability statute. 
Moreover, accepting the plea offer provided petitioner significant benefits. In 
addition to removing the risk of a murder conviction and a life sentence, petitioner's plea 
also enhanced his chances for probation. Petitioner would only be convicted of a second, 
rather than a first degree felony and could argue that he had accepted responsibility for 
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his actions. Moreover, the plea offer gave petitioner the benefit of the State's agreement 
to remain silent on his motion to reduce the degree of his offense to a third degree felony 
In short, the risks of going to trial outweighed the benefits of the plea offer. 
Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly found that Mr. Brass's advice to accept the 
plea offer was not objectively unreasonable. 
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Sean Darger's subsequent acquittal of a murder 
charge does not demonstrate that Mr. Brass unreasonably advised petitioner to accept the 
State's plea offer As petitioner acknowledges, Darger was not tried for murder until 
after petitioner accepted his plea. Br. Aplt. at 20. Because a court must make every 
effort to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight" and "to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, the outcome of Darger's 
case should not be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of Mr. Brass's advice. 
In any event, Darger's case provided a poor standard for predicting what would 
have occurred had petitioner gone to trial on a murder charge. Having handled both 
petitioner's and Darger's cases, the post-conviction court specifically rejected petitioner's 
argument that Darger was at least as culpable, if not more culpable that petitioner. R. 262 
(Add. B). Therefore, even if this Court were to apply the distorting effects of hindsight 
and evaluate Mr. Brass's advice based on information that was unknown to him, the 
outcome of Darger's case provides no support for petitioner's claim that Mr. Brass's 
advice was unreasonable. 
Additionally, the post-conviction court correctly denied this claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced by Mr 
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Brass's allegedly deficient performance. Petitioner affirmatively waived his opportunity 
to put on evidence demonstrating that, but for Mr. Brass's allegedly deficient 
performance, he would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial. R. 270 (Add. 
B). Therefore, petitioner's claim also fails for lack of prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted this £> day of November 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-3-203J. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection '4) m concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons participated as partieb to the 
offense under Section 76-2-202. 
ic) In determining if a convicted person committed an offense m concert 
with two or more persons, the standard of proof applied by the sentencing 
judge shall be the preponderance of the evidence. 3 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years m 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1. 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2, 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3, 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part I. 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76. 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3. 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510. 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518. and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3. Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307. 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508. 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) (i) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether 
to impose the enhanced penalty under this section. 
(ii) The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon a finding by 
the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence that this 
section is applicable. 
(iii) In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter written 
findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
History: C. 1963,76-3-203.1, enacted by L. criminally liable" making a minor stylistic 
1990, ch. 207, 3 1; 1994, ch. 12, S 108; 1999, change; added Subsection (lWc/; divided Sub-
ch. 11, § 1. section (5Xc) adding the (i) to <u0 designations: 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- and added "'by a preponderance of the evidence" 
ment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection m Subsection iSMcrtu). 
(1Kb) substituted "participated" for "would be 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW D. MOENCH, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Petitioner, LAW, AND ORDER DENYING PETITION 
v. FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 010901454 
Respondent. 
Judge William W. Barrett 
This matter came before the Court on 4 March 2003 for oral argument on petitioner's 
petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act, and the State's response thereto. 
Petitioner was present and appeared through counsel, Mr. Bruce A. Jacques. The State appeared 
through counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard. The Court has reviewed the 
petition, the supporting memorandum, and the State's response. The Court also heard argument 
from counsel for both parties. Now being fully advised in the premises, the Court issues the 
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying the petition: 
< . > ' ; * -n. -. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Crimes 
1. Petitioner, a member of the "Straight Edge" gang, and several of his associates in the 
gang, became involved in a fight with another group of young men including Bernardo Repreza. 
Exhibit A at 3; Exhibit B at 2.1 
2. During the fight, Jason Cunningham and petitioner chased Repreza while Sean Darger 
yelled to the two to "get him." Exhibit B at 2. Cunningham struck Repreza with an expandible 
police baton causing Repreza to fall. Id. Petitioner then hit Repreza several times in the head 
with a baseball bat or other large piece of wood, seriously injuring Repreza. Exhibit A at 3; 
Exhibit B at 2; Exhibit C 1-2. Collin Ressor then stabbed Repreza in the abdomen. Exhibit A at 
3. Repreza died from the stab wound. Exhibit A at 4. 
3. On 5 November 1998 the State charged petitioner with murder, a first degree felony. 
Exhibit A at 1. It also sought to impose an enhanced penalty, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-3-203.1, because it alleged that petitioner committed the crime in concert with two or more 
persons. Id. 
4. This Court handled the criminal proceedings for both petitioner and Sean Darger. 
5. Darger was acquitted of murder. Nevertheless, given the Court's recollection of the 
facts of both cases, the Court rejects petitioner's contention that Darger was at least equally, if 
not more culpable than petitioner, and that Darger's case provides a good comparison of what 
would have happened had petitioner gone to trial on a murder charge. 
1
 All Exhibits are attached to the State's response to the petition. 
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6. Although the blows that petitioner struck to Repreza's head did not cause Repreza's 
death, petitioner beat Repreza until he was unconscious, giving Ressor the opportunity to stab 
and kill Repreza. 
Proceedings in the District Court 
7. In district court, petitioner, represented by Mr. Ed Brass, moved to dismiss the murder 
charge, or to quash the magistrate's order binding him over for trial. Exhibit D. Petitioner 
argued that there was no evidence presented at his preliminary hearing that he participated in a 
homicide, or that if such evidence was presented, it was insufficient to bind him over for trial. 
Id 
8. The Court denied the motion. Exhibit E. 
9. Mr. Brass also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude as evidence, a videotape 
recording of petitioner's interview with the staff of the 20/20 television news program. Exhibit 
E. 
10. The Court granted the motion, finding that "the interview would be very 
inflammatory, creating unfair prejudice and may even prevent [petitioner] from receiving a fair 
trial." Exhibit E. 
State v. Lopes 
11. On 16 March 1999 the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Lopes, 1999 
UT24,980P.2dl91. 
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12. In Lopes, the Utah Supreme Court found unconstitutional subsection (5)(c) of § 76-3-
203.1. 1999 UT 24 at If 17. That subsection allowed a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, to 
decide whether to impose an enhanced penalty under the section. See id. 
13. However, Lopes found "the remaining portion of the gang enhancement statute 
constitutional." Id. at f 20. 
The Plea Affidavit 
14. Mr. Brass negotiated a generous plea agreement with the State. Exhibit B. 
15. Petitioner accepted the offer and entered a guilty plea on 20 October 1999. Exhibit 
B. 
16. The agreement required the State to reduce the charge from murder, a first degree 
felony, to aggravated assault, a second degree felony. Exhibit B at 1, 8; Exhibit F. It also 
required that if the Court sentenced petitioner to prison, the State would remain silent on a 
motion to reduce the degree of the offense to a third degree felony. Exhibit B at 8; Exhibit G at 
11-12. 
17. In conjunction with the plea agreement, the State filed a second amended information 
charging petitioner with aggravated assault, a second degree felony. Exhibit F. 
18. The second amended information stated, in a separate paragraph, that "pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1," petitioner would be subject to an enhanced penalty "because 
the offense was committed in concert with two or more persons/' 
4 
19. Petitioner's plea affidavit set forth the elements of petitioner's crime as, "[t]he actor 
commits an assault and intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another. He does so in 
concert with two or more other people." Exhibit C at 1. 
20. Petitioner admitted the following facts in his plea affidavit: 
"[m]y conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, 
that constitutes the elements of the crime charged are as follows: On 31 October 
1998, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I intentionally struck Bernard Repreza in the 
head with a club. According to Dr. Leis, this resulted in serious bodily injury. 
Immediately prior to my striking him, Jason Cunningham struck him with a baton. 
We had been urged to chase and 'get him' by a third person." 
Exhibit Cat 1-2. 
21. In his plea affidavit, petitioner also stated "I know that if I wish to contest the charge 
against me, I need only plead 'not guilty' and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State 
of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Exhibit Cat 3. 
22. Petitioner also stated in the affidavit, "I have read this statement or I have had it read 
to me by my attorney and I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this affidavit. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct." Exhibit C at 4. 
The Plea Colloquy 
23. During the plea colloquy, Mr. Brass referred to petitioner's plea affidavit and stated 
that he had reviewed it with petitioner and that he was certain petitioner understood it. Exhibit F 
at 7. 
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24. The Court asked petitioner whether he intended to plead guilty to the "second 
amended information charging you with an aggravated assault with a gang enhancement/' 
Exhibit F at 7-8. Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id. at 8. 
25. The Court questioned petitioner about his physical and mental state and reviewed 
with him the constitutional rights he would waive by pleading guilty. Exhibit F at 8-9. 
26. The Court then asked Mr. Brass to state the factual basis of the plea. Exhibit F at 9-
10. 
27. The Court also stated, "obviously the factual statement will include each and every 
element of the offense as charged." Exhibit F at 10. Mr. Brass replied, "It does." Id. 
28. Mr. Brass then read, verbatim, the factual basis as admitted by petitioner in the plea 
affidavit. Exhibit F at 10. 
29. The Court then inquired of petitioner whether those facts were true. Exhibit F at 11. 
Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id. 
30. Thereafter, the Court asked, "by admitting and pleading guilty to the charge . .. 
you're admitting each and every element of the offense. Do you understand that?" Exhibit F at 
11. Petitioner replied, "Yes." Id. 
31. Petitioner also stated that he understood that the maximum sentence that could be 
imposed was six-to-fifteen years. Exhibit F at 11. 
32. Petitioner pled guilty to having committed an aggravated assault while acting in 
concert with two or more persons. Exhibit B at 1; Exhibit G at 7-8; 10-11; 14-15. 
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33. Based on petitioner's admissions in his plea affidavit and dunng the colloquy, the 
Court specifically found that "this charge was done in connection with two or more persons/1 
and "therefore, the gang enhancement is appropriate." Exhibit G at 14-15. 
34. The Court accepted petitioner's plea, finding that he entered it "freely, voluntarily 
and knowingly." Exhibit G at 15. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Regarding the Sentencing Enhancement 
35. Following petitioner's plea, the Court entered written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding the sentencing enhancement. Exhibit B. 
36. The findings state that petitioner "admitted facts in support of the plea including that 
he acted in concert with two other persons." Exhibit B at 1. 
37. The findings also state that "Defendant, Cunningham and Darger each had the mental 
state required for commission of the assault on Repreza." 
Sentencing 
38. Petitioner requested the Court to obtain a presentence report and waived the 
maximum forty-five day time period for sentencing. Exhibit G at 15-16. 
39 At sentencing, Mr. Brass argued that the Court should sentence petitioner to one year 
in jail and then place him on probation. Exhibit H at 7-8. 
40. Mr. Brass moved the Court to reduce the category of petitioner's offense to a third 
degree felony, "pursuant to 76-3-402," if the Court was inclined to commit petitioner to pnson, 
Id 
1 
41. The Court sentenced petitioner to serve six-to-fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
Exhibit Gat 35; Exhibit I. 
The Post-Conviction Petition 
42. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The Court dismissed the petition 
as frivolous after reviewing the ments of petitioner's claims. Moench v. State, 2002 UT App. 
333 t 3, 57 P 3d 1116. 
43. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions that the Court order the 
Attorney General to file a response to the petition. Id. at f 14. 
44. The petition asserts the following claims: 
a) Mr. Brass was ineffective because he: 
1) failed to move to reduce the degree of 
petitioner's offense, despite his promise to do so; 
2) failed to object to the imposition of a "gang 
enhancement" at sentencing; and 
3) failed to act in petitioner's best interest when he 
encouraged petitioner to accept the plea offer, rather 
than going to trial on a murder charge; 
b) Petitioner's plea was not knowingly entered because he was not 
informed of the elements of the "gang enhancement" or that the 
State was required to prove the elements of the enhancement. 
Additionally, the factual basis to support his plea to the "gang 
enhancement" was insufficient. 
c) The "gang enhancement" statute under which he was sentenced, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1, was unconstitutional. 
d) The trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence petitioner when it 
failed to impose sentence within forty-five days of the entry of his 
plea. 
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Pet. at 7-8; Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 3-18. 
45. On 4 March 2003 the Court held oral argument on the petition and the State's 
response. 
46. At oral argument, petitioner conceded that he was not entitled to relief on the 
following claims: 
a. that Mr. Brass was ineffective for failing to move to reduce the degree of his 
offense; 
b. that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce sentence. 
47. Also during oral argument, Mr. Jacques stated that he was prepared to call petitioner 
and petitioner's father to testify about petitioner's alleged confusion regarding the plea 
proceedings. 
48. The Court stated that it would be willing to hear the testimony. 
49. The State objected to the Court taking evidence at the oral argument hearing because 
the State had no prior notice that evidence would be taken, and was unprepared to cross-examine 
petitioner's witnesses. The State also argued that the Court would need to hear the testimony of 
Mr. Brass, who was not present. 
50. After hearing the State's objection, the Court stated that it would not take evidence at 
the oral argument hearing, but would schedule an evidentiary hearing if petitioner so desired. 
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51. In presenting its argument to the Court, the State argued that the Court did not need 
to take evidence because the record of petitioner's underlying criminal case conclusively refuted 
petitioner's claims. 
52. After hearing argument from both parties, the Court stated that it tended to agree 
with the State's position and was prepared to rule based on the pleadings and arguments before 
it. 
53. Nevertheless, the Court also stated that it believed this was a "sensitive case," and 
was therefore willing to set an evidentiary heanng to hear additional evidence if petitioner so 
desired. 
54. The Court then took a brief recess to allow Mr. Jacques to consult with petitioner 
regarding his desire for an evidentiary hearing. 
55. During the recess, the Court reviewed again State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (1999), and 
the petition. 
56. Following the recess, petitioner declined the Court's invitation to set the matter for 
an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Jacques explained that after consulting with petitioner, they had 
concluded that "it was not in petitioner's interest to have an evidentiary heanng." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims regarding Mr. Brass's alleged failure to 
move to reduce his sentence, and the trial court's lack of junsdiction to pronounce sentence, 
because petitioner waived those claims at oral argument. 
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2. Mr. Brass was not ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of the "gang 
enhancement/' 
a. Although petitioner claims Mr. Brass should have objected because the 
enhancement was unconstitutional, Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 5-10, Lopes did not declare 
the "gang enhancement" unconstitutional. See 1999 UT 24, ff 17-20. Rather, it only 
declared unconstitutional the manner in which the enhancement was imposed. Id. 
b. Petitioner also claims Mr. Brass should have objected to the imposition of the 
enhancement because it was not properly charged as a separate offense. Mem. in Supp. 
of Pet. at 5-10. Both the original and the amended information, however, clearly set forth 
the enhancement-including the language that the offense be "committed in concert with 
two or more persons"- in a separate paragraph. Exhibit A; Exhibit F. Moreover, it is 
clear from petitioner's plea affidavit and colloquy that petitioner understood he was 
pleading guilty not just to aggravated assault, but also to the separate "gang 
enhancement." Exhibit C at 1-2; Exhibit G at 7-8, 10-11,13. 
c. Petitioner also claims Mr. Brass should have objected to the imposition of the 
enhancement because petitioner did not understand that the State would have to prove the 
elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 5-10. 
Again, petitioner's plea affidavit and colloquy evidence petitioner's understanding that 
absent his guilty plea, the State bore the burden of proving each element of his crime-
including the gang enhancement-bey ond a reasonable doubt. Exhibit C at 3; Exhibit G at 
9,11. 
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d Petitioner claims that his plea was insufficient to establish a factual basis for 
imposing the enhancement because his admission could not establish the culpability of 
those with whom he acted in concert. Mem. in Supp of Pet at 11 Petitioner's plea, 
however, admitted the elements of the enhancement and relieved the State of its burden 
to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt Lopes acknowledges that, just as 
with any crime, a valid guilty plea to the elements of the "gang enhancement" is 
sufficient See 1999 UT 24 at f 17 Lopes states that "absent waiver, only a jury has the 
ability to determine when the elements of a cnme are established beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id (emphasis added). The Lopes Court was also careful to explain that they 
could properly consider the constitutionality of the imposition of the enhancement only 
because Lopes had not admitted the elements of the "gang enhancement" in entering his 
conditional guilty plea. Id at J 4 n 3 In petitioner's case, his plea affidavit specifically 
referenced "[his] conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminal 
liable " Exhibit C at 1 (emphasis added) He also admitted that he acted in concert with 
two or more persons. Exhibit B at 2; Exhibit C at 1-2, Exhibit G at 7 8, 10-11, 13, 14-15 
These admissions were sufficient to prove the elements of the "gang enhancement" 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3 Mr Brass was not ineffective for encouraging petitioner to accept the plea offer 
Mem in Supp of Pet at 3-4 Petitioner claims that Mr Brass should have encouraged him to 
stand tnal on the murder charge, rather than accepting the plea offer, because petitioner likely 
would have acquitted of murder, just as Darger later was Id This claim is precisely the type of 
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hindsight, second-guessing that the Unites States Supreme Court prohibited in Strickland v 
Washington, 466 U S 668, 689 (1984) By accepting the plea offer, petitioner obtained 
substantial benefits and avoided significant risks. Evaluating Mr Brass's performance at the 
time of the plea, it is clear that Mr Brass's advice to accept the plea offer did not "f[a]ll below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." See id at 688 In any event, even if Mr Brass could and 
should have considered the subsequent outcome of Darger's case, Mr Brass's advice was still 
reasonable because Darger was not equally, or more culpable than petitioner 
4 In addition to alleging that Mr. Brass was ineffective for failing to object to his 
allegedly invalid plea, petitioner also challenges the validity of his guilty plea directly Mem in 
Supp of Pet at 10-12 These claims fail for the same reasons that petitioner's ineffective 
assistance claims fail As explained above, the record of petitioner's plea conclusively 
establishes that his plea to both the aggravated assault and the "gang enhancement" was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. Furthermore, the "gang enhancement" was not 
unconstitutional 
5 Even if the record of petitioner's plea did not conclusively resolve petitioner's claims, 
his claims would nevertheless fail for lack of proof Petitioner bears the burden of establishing 
that he is entitled to post-conviction relief See UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-105 The Court gave 
petitioner the opportunity to present additional evidence to support his claims Petitioner waived 
that opportunity Consequently, even if the underlying criminal record did not conclusively 
establish the validity of petitioner's plea and the effectiveness of his counsel, petitioner failed to 
satisfy his burden of proof 
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ORDER 
Based upon the above findings and conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act is DENIED. 
31 DATED this ^ ' day of March, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Bruce A. Jacques 
Counsel for Petitioner 
Judge William W. Barrett 
  .  
Third Judicial District Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 14 March 2003 I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, to Bruce A. Jacques, 859 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B, South Jordan, UT 
840905, and further certify that as of 25 March 2003 I have received no response. 
Christopher D. Ballard 
Counsel for Respondent 
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